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Abstract Human cognitive uniqueness is often defined in
terms of cognitive abilities such as introspection, imitation
and cooperativeness. However, little is known about how
those traits vary in populations or correlate across indi-
viduals. Here we test whether those three cognitive
domains are correlated manifestations of an underlying
factor, analogous to the psychometric ‘g’ factor, or inde-
pendent ‘behavioural phenotypes’, analogous to the ‘Big-
Five’ personality components. We selected eight variables
measuring introspection and extraversion, verbal and
physical imitation, cooperation and punishment, and eval-
uated their individual variability, domain-consistency and
sub-structuring in a sample of 84 individuals. Results show
high variation and limited clustering into three independent
‘behavioural phenotypes’ of introspection, imitation and
cooperation. Only one significant correlation was identified
(between two measures of extraversion), while other
within-domain measures (introspection vs. extraversion,
verbal vs. physical imitation, and cooperation vs. punish-
ment) were not associated. Finally, no between-domain
association was identified either through correlations or
factor analysis. Overall, the results do not lend support to
the hypothesis of a general ‘behavioural phenotype’
underlying individual behaviour. The independence of
behaviours of introspection, imitation and cooperation may
be the reason why individuals are able to adopt different
behavioural strategies (combinations of behavioural phe-
notypes) and play distinct roles in the maintenance of
human distinctive features such as hyper-cooperation and
cumulative culture.
Keywords Cognition  Introspection  Imitation 
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Introduction
Human societies exhibit unique features such as hyper-
cooperation and cumulative culture (Burkart et al. 2014),
often interpreted as the result of cognitive traits distin-
guishing humans from other species. Cumulative culture
relies on high-fidelity transmission of socially shared
knowledge (Dean et al. 2014), which is possible due to the
human propensity to overimitate role models or copy
actions irrelevant to achieving an explicit goal (Legare and
Nielsen 2015). Introspection is another cognitive ability
interpreted as distinctively human and our ‘default-mode
processing’ allowing for mental displacement in space and
time (Wilson et al. 2014), and even as the feature that
allowed modern humans to outcompete Neanderthals
(Mithen 1996). Extensive cooperation with unrelated and
even unknown individuals and engagement in punishment
of free-riders at an individual cost (Fehr and Gachter 2002)
are two other features often claimed to differentiate
humans from other species.
Although introspection, imitation, cooperativeness and
other human cognitive abilities have been frequently
investigated in isolation, little is known about how they are
structured at individual level. For example, introspection,
imitation and cooperation may be correlated in individuals,
suggesting the existence of some general factor underlying
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human unique behavioural domains. In this case, we would
be able to establish an analogy between those traits and the
‘general intelligence’ or ‘g’ factor often proposed to
explain correlations across results of cognitive tasks (Deary
2001). Alternatively, traits such as introspection, imitation
and cooperation may vary in mosaic fashion across indi-
viduals. This would suggest a parallel with psychological
studies revealing a few independent personality compo-
nents found in different combinations in individuals (Nettle
2006). Between the two extremes of full integration and
mosaicism, a third possibility is partial linkage across some
behavioural characteristics; for example, cooperative indi-
viduals may be more or less likely to overimitate, or more
or less prone to engage in introspection. However, although
many studies have examined the relationship between
‘agreeableness’, ‘openness’ and other ‘Big Five’ human
personality components, there has been no analysis of
associations between traits claimed to explain human
cognitive uniqueness such as introspection, imitation or
cooperation.
Peysakhovich et al. (2014) provided an initial attempt to
investigate the structure and consistency of the human
cooperative domain. Based on the application of multiple
economic games and questionnaires to a large sample, they
found that cooperative behaviours are consistent at indi-
vidual level (co-operators or punishers in one economic
game tend to cooperate or punish in other games and in real
life) and over time (co-operators or punishers remained co-
operators or punishers over time). They also showed that
cooperative behaviours presented an internal subdivision:
there was no association between measures of cooperation
(offers in Dictator, Trust and Public Goods Games, beha-
viours and values of cooperation assessed via question-
naires) and measures of punishment (rejections in
Ultimatum Game, behaviours and values of punishment
from questionnaires). Based on this evidence, they pro-
posed the existence of a human ‘cooperative phenotype’
characterised by consistency and sub-structuring of coop-
erative behaviours. A similar study based on 14 experi-
ments has identified four independent subcomponents of
prosociality across individuals (Bockler et al. 2016).
Extrapolating from those results, we can ask whether other
human cognitive domains, and even human cognition as a
whole, display similar properties of individual variation,
consistency and sub-structuring.
Here we test whether the cognitive domains of intro-
spection and imitation can also be characterised as ‘be-
havioural phenotypes’. Those two domains were selected
because they are frequently claimed to define human cog-
nitive uniqueness, although they are by no means the only
ones. We also assessed cooperative behaviours, in order to
test for correlations across the three domains. The major
aim of our analyses was to investigate whether the three
behavioural domains are integrated in individuals, reflect-
ing some general cognitive factor analogous to ‘g’, or vary
independently in a similar way to the ‘Big Five’ personality
components. We obtained multiple measures of imitation,
introspection and cooperation and evaluated individual
variability, domain-consistency and sub-structuring within
each of our three selected behavioural phenotypes. Our
results show that although all measures exhibit significant
variability, there is some evidence (although preliminary
and needing confirmation by further studies) that individual
behaviour may be organised into independent ‘behavioural
phenotypes’ of introspection, imitation and cooperation.
However, behavioural integration does not seem to extend
across the three domains into a ‘general’ behavioural
phenotype analogous to ‘g’. The variability and indepen-
dence of behaviours of introspection, imitation and coop-
eration may explain why individuals remain able to adopt
different behavioural strategies (or combinations of beha-
vioural phenotypes) and play different roles in the main-
tenance of human features such as hyper-cooperation and
cumulative culture.
Methods
We ran cognitive experiments and questionnaires (N = 84
subjects, 37 males; mean age = 27.8; age range 18–64)
covering three behavioural domains: introspection, imita-
tion and cooperation:
Introspection
Thinking Period experiment (adapted from Wilson et al.
2014): participants were instructed to sit alone in a sterile
lab (Fig. 1a) for 15 min and later were asked to rate two
statements on a 5-point agreement scale (‘‘Did you enjoy
the 15-min thinking period?’’; ‘‘Would you like to do
another 15-min thinking period?’’).
Imitation
(1) Syntactic Alignment (adapted from Branigan et al.
2007): the experimenter selected a card showing two
objects and a written verb, and then described the depicted
event using one sentence, either in active or passive voice
(example: ‘the ball broke the window’, or ‘the window was
broken by the ball’; see examples in Fig. 1b). Then the
participant was shown a new card and asked to do the
same. The experimenter initiated ten descriptions alter-
nating active and passive voice. The measure of syntactic
alignment was the number of times the participant repli-
cated the experimenter’s choice of active or passive voice.
(2) Imitation Box (adapted from Horner and Whiten 2005):
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participants watched twice a short video of a person
retrieving a toy from a transparent box after four actions,
two necessary or ‘rational’ (flipping the box right side up,
opening the latch) and two unnecessary or ‘irrational’
(removing an elastic band, unlocking a padlock attached to
a ribbon; Fig. 1c). Participants were then presented with
the same box and asked to retrieve the toy, and the number
of copied unnecessary actions was counted. Finally we
asked participants about how many actions they remem-
bered from the video demonstration, and which ones they
considered to be necessary to open the box. Interestingly,
50 participants believed that removing the padlock was
necessary, and 9 thought that the removing the elastic was
necessary. Analysing separately the subsample of individ-
uals who were aware of the irrationality of both padlock
and elastic removal (N = 31) did not change the overall
results. For this reason, we only present results from the
whole sample (N = 84).
Cooperation
Participants played two classic economic games for a fee.
(1) Dictator Game: Player A was given £5 and could share
from 1p to £5 with an unknown Player B. (2) Ultimatum
Game: Player A was given £5 to split with an anonymous
Player B, who could either accept the offer (splitting the
money as proposed by Player A) or reject it (in which case
neither Player A or B received money). Sample size is
n = 84 in the Dictator Game, but was split into two in the
Ultimatum Game (42 subjects were selected as Player A,
and 42 as Player B).
Questionnaires
After the experiments, subjects were asked to rate state-
ments on a 5-point agreement scale. The statements cov-
ered three topics: extraversion (Myers 1962), social media
use (Wilson et al. 2014), and values and behaviours of
cooperation and punishment (Peysakhovich et al. 2014).
Variable Definition
From the experiments and questionnaires above, we
derived eight variables assessing individual behaviour.
Introspection domain: (1) Introspection Score (IS), sum of
agreement ranks from two questions on the Thinking Per-
iod experiment; (2) Extraversion Score (ES), sum of ranks
from nine questions; (3) Social Media Score (SM), sum of
scores of eight questions. Imitation domain: (4) Syntactic
Alignment Score (SA), number of times subjects copied the
experimenter’s choice of active or passive voice; (5) Imi-
tation Box Score (IB), number of irrational moves copied
by participant. Cooperation domain: (6) Dictator Game
offer (DG); (7) Ultimatum Game offer (UG); and (8)
Behaviours of Punishment score (BP), sum of answers to
three questions.
Analyses
We ran non-parametric Kendall correlations between all
eight variables, with Holm-Bonferroni correction for mul-
tiple testing (28 correlation tests). We also performed PCA
Fig. 1 Experimental setting
and apparatuses. a Laboratory
setting for the Thinking Period
experiment; b Syntactic
alignment cards; c Imitation box
(notice position of elastic band
and padlock)
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and factor analysis to investigate possible underlying fac-
tors across domains.
Results
Behaviours Across Cognitive Domains are Variable
and Typically not Extreme
All traits showed significant variation between extremes of
introspection and extrospection, introversion and
extraversion, overimitation and innovation, cooperation
and selfishness, punishment and non-punishment (Fig. 2).
There is significant variability in enjoyment of introspec-
tion, rejecting a previous suggestion (Wilson et al. 2014)
that people generally dislike thinking periods (see Fox
et al. 2014). Both measures of imitation showed interme-
diate peaks, indicating that extremes of overimitation or
innovation are not the rule in humans. With the exception
of Dictator Game offers (with two peaks near the minimum
and egalitarian offers) and behaviours of punishment (with
peaks at the lowest values), distributions are also approx-
imately bell-shaped rather than characterised by extreme
values. However, distributions of all variables (except
Extraversion Score and Social Media Score) significantly
deviate from normality (Shapiro–Wilk tests, P\ 0.05).
Intra-Domain Correlations Suggest Independent
‘Behavioural Phenotypes’
Despite extensive variation in all traits, only one significant
correlation was identified between variables. The two
measures of extraversion, Extraversion Score and Social
Media Score, correlated significantly (Kendall tau = 0.24,
z = 3.1, P = 0.04 after Holm–Bonferroni correction), but
neither correlated with the Introspection Score. There was
no correlation between verbal and physical imitation
(Syntactic Alignment Score and Imitation Box). There was
Fig. 2 Distribution of introspection, imitation and cooperation vari-
ables. Histograms display distributions of nine variables: a Introspec-
tion score (IS), b Extraversion score (ES), c Social media score (SM),
d Syntactic alignment score, e Imitation box score (IB), f Dictator
game offer (DG), g Ultimatum game offer (UG), h Behaviours of
punishment score (BP), i Values of punishment score (VP). Sample
size is 101 individuals, except for UG where sample size is 50. For
definitions of each variable see ‘‘Methods’’ section
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also a correlation between two measures of cooperation in
economic games, Dictator Game offer and Ultimatum
Game offer (Kendall tau = 0.36, z = 2.9, P = 0.0037),
but it becomes non-significant after correction for multiple
testing (P = 0.1). None of the remaining correlations
achieved significance even before correction for multiple
testing. In summary, correlation tests provide very limited
evidence for internal structuring within the three domains
of introspection, cooperation or imitation.
No Evidence of a General ‘Behavioural Phenotype’
Next we tested for inter-domain correlations among intro-
spection, imitation and cooperation variables, but none was
significant (all P[ 0.1 before Holm-Bonferroni correc-
tion). Lastly we searched for general factors underlying
variation in individual behaviours. An exploratory PCA
produced a first PC explaining only 23.8% of total variance
(vs. 12.5% expected by random chance), and no clear drop
in subsequent PCs (PC 2: 18.2%, PC 3: 16.2%). We also
ran factor analyses with up to four factors (the maximum
possible for eight variables), but none was significant
(significance was at least P = 0.18), indicating no general
association of variables across domains. PCAs and factor
analyses remain not significant, even after removal of the
two non-bell-shaped variables (Dictator Game offer and
behaviours of punishment).
Discussion
Our main finding is that there is no evidence that human
behaviours across the domains of introspection, imitation
and cooperation are structured by a pervasive ‘behavioural
phenotype’ or underlying factor analogous to the ‘g’ factor.
The lack of correlation between cooperation and punish-
ment variables confirmed previous suggestions of a sub-
structured ‘cooperative phenotype’ (Peysakhovich et al.
2014). The loss of significance of the correlation between
Dictator Game and Ultimatum Game offers after correction
for multiple testing may reflect a further differentiation
between respectively ‘altruistic’ and ‘strategic’ prosocial
behaviours (Bockler et al. 2016) or simply too much noise
in our sample. Further testing with larger samples is needed
to provide an answer to this question. The only significant
correlation (between Extraversion Score and Social Media
Score) was internal to the introspection domain. However,
neither of those two measures of introversion showed an
association with our measure of introspection (Introspec-
tion Score). This suggests that extraversion (the tendency
to seek social interactions) and introspection (inward-di-
rected thought) may coexist in the same individual. The
lack of correlation between introspective and extraverted
behaviours seems to be analogous to the independence of
cooperation and punishment within the ‘cooperative phe-
notype’, thus providing partial evidence for internal sub-
structuring of an ‘introspection phenotype’. Also, for the
first time we have shown that that individual biases in
physical (imitation box) and verbal (syntactic alignment)
imitation seem to vary independently, suggesting that they
may represent two separate aspects of a possible ‘imitation
phenotype’. Finally, the lack of general integration across
the three domains also implies that distinct combinations of
innovative, imitative and cooperative behaviours are pos-
sible at individual level.
However, the results above must be interpreted with
care. The lack of correlations and significant underlying
factors are negative results. As such, although they are
relevant for not supporting the hypothesis of a general
‘behavioural phenotype’, they cannot definitely reject its
existence. More convincing demonstration would require
larger sample sizes and further testing. Therefore, the main
contribution of our study is to suggest that an underlying
behavioural factor across the domains of introspection,
imitation and cooperation cannot be as easily identified as
the ‘g’ factor or ‘general intelligence’ factor, often revealed
by psychometric studies based on sample sizes similar to
ours.
The absence of convincing evidence for a ‘behavioural
phenotype’ underling individual behaviour is nonetheless
relevant to current debates over human cognitive unique-
ness. Some studies have proposed that cognitive abilities
such as overimitation, introspection and cooperativeness
can distinguish humans from other species. However,
chimpanzees, our closest relatives, also initiate and main-
tain cooperation (Suchak et al. 2014), exhibit cultural
variation in the wild (Hobaiter et al. 2014), imitate group
traditions (Whiten et al. 2009) and may act based on a
theory of mind (Hare et al. 2001). In addition, there is
significant overlap in cognitive tests between the two
species. Experiments by Hermann et al. (2007) revealed
individual success rates in children between 35 and 100%
in social learning tests, 20–100% in communication tests,
and 20–100% in theory of mind tests. In adult chim-
panzees, figures were respectively 0–70, 20–90 and
20–75%. Consistent with those results, our tests revealed
significant behavioural variability in the three domains, and
a prevalence of intermediate values across measures. The
results seem to rule out the possibility that human beha-
viour is generally characterised by a tendency towards
extremes of introspection, imitation or cooperation. Toge-
ther, the results point against the possibility of differenti-
ating human from chimpanzee cognition simply in terms of
the presence or absence of the three cognitive abilities.
We suggest that human cognitive uniqueness may be
more easily defined by frequencies of behaviours at
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population level. In our sample, approximately 40% of
individuals made egalitarian offers in the Dictator Game,
50% enjoyed introspection in the Thinking Period assay,
and 77% copied at least one irrational move in the Imita-
tion Box test. Previous studies claimed that cumulative
culture and hyper-cooperation may depend on population
size (Powell et al. 2009), and we extend this argument by
proposing that they might also require a minimum number
of co-operators and over-imitating individuals respectively.
For example, agent-based simulations showed that about
80% of individuals should be co-operators (against 20%
free-riders) in order for demand sharing, a possibly
ancestral form of human hyper-cooperation, to be main-
tained in hunter-gatherer populations (Lewis et al. 2014).
Similar arguments may hold for cumulative culture, with
some studies proposing that it might depend on a combi-
nation of imitative behaviours (that provide fidelity to
cultural transmission) and innovative behaviours (that
allow cultural change to occur) (Legare and Nielsen 2015).
This proposal is compatible with individuals remaining
able to adopt distinct decision-making strategies and social
behaviours, and with independence and combinatorial
variety of behavioural phenotypes. The apparent dissocia-
tion among introspection, imitation and cooperation beha-
viours in our sample contrasts not only with the
psychometric ‘g’ factor, but also with a proposed inter-
specific or ‘primate g’ or ‘gs’ (Reader et al. 2011), a gen-
eral intelligence factor across primates derived from strong
correlations among cognitive abilities such as social
learning, innovation rates and tool use (the ‘cultural’ core
of gs). The contrast between a general primate ‘g’ factor
and our independent behavioural phenotypes may be
explained by the different traits used to define human
cognitive uniqueness, by differences between intra- versus
inter-specific comparisons, or as discussed above, by noise
in our particular sample.
Our study can be seen as a contribution of cognitive
science to the general debate on the roles of modularity and
integration in human evolution. Previous analyses have
contrasted mosaicism versus developmental and functional
integration in relation to skull morphology (Bastir 2008);
grade shifts and mosaic evolution (Barton and Harvey
2000; Smaers et al. 2010) versus general scaling principles
and developmental integration (Mota and Herculano-Hou-
zel 2015) in the context of primate and human brain evo-
lution; modular (Fodor 1983) versus connectionist models
(Elman 2005) of brain function, among others. At the
cognitive level, theories based either on massive modu-
larity (Tooby and Cosmides 1992) or increased integration
(Mithen 1996) have also been proposed but are difficult to
experimentally verify. Explaining human cognitive
uniqueness from an experimental perspective is a complex
topic. Getting closer to an answer requires a better
understanding of how components of human cognition,
however defined, vary and relate at individual and popu-
lation level. Our study design presents some limitations,
including the lack of test–retest reliability measures (due to
time constraints). Psychometric experiments can also suffer
from the presence of floor or ceiling effects, which could
be especially true for our Imitation Box experiment that
included only three possible results. In the future, this
could be solved through the application of multiple imi-
tation tasks to each participant and calculation of a total
individual imitation score. However, our variable distri-
butions were never concentrated at lower or higher values
and mode/median values were as a rule found in the mid-
range, with the exception of the well-studied bimodal
distribution of Dictator Game offer with peak values at 0
(selfish offer) and middle of the range (egalitarian offer).
As discussed above, our negative results seem do not lend
to support to the existence of a general ‘behavioural phe-
notype’, but do not allow definitive rejection of this
hypothesis. Our study is therefore a starting point to psy-
chometric investigations of traits claimed to define human
cognitive uniqueness. Further studies of verbal, physical
and other modalities of imitative behaviour, as well as
other measures of introspection and introversion, are nec-
essary to confirm whether ‘behavioural phenotypes’ other
than cooperation characterise human cognition.
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